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THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE. By Isaak L Dore. London: Graham &
Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff. 1993. Pp. ix, 222. $110.
Isaak Dore 1 should have taken one step back or one step forward.
In The UNCITRAL Framework for Arbitration in Contemporary
Perspective, he provides a useful framework for international commercial arbitration, but one that he views from an uncertain perspective.
Dore analyzes the text of both the United Nations Commission for
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules2 and the
UNCITRAL Model Law in detail, but his textual focus proves costly:
Dore's book does not satisfy our theoretical questions, nor does it
often provide answers to our most basic practical questions.
In the field of international arbitration law, a few works seek to
examine the purposes of arbitration and how to achieve them. 3 Others
provide practical advice on topics such as how to draft an arbitration
clause in the context of a commercial negotiation.4 The UNCITRAL
Framework falls uneasily in between. Dore has previously addressed
the "theory and practice" of multiparty arbitration, 5 and he proposes
to take the same approach here. But while his book provides some
helpful information for those using the UNCITRAL arbitration
framework, as well as some answers for those wondering why the
drafters constructed the framework the way they did, Dore's practical
and theoretical analyses are both ultimately unsatisfying. He is at his
best when he focuses on one type of analysis or the other.
The book commences with a textual comparison of the UNCITRAL rules with two other sets of rules designed to govern international commercial disputes (pp. 3-51) - those of the International
1. Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.
2. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 31 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reprinted in 7 Y.B. COMMN. INTL. TRADE
L. 22 (1976).
3. See, e.g.• HORACIO A. GRIGERA NA6N, CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS JN INTERNATlONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATlON 1 (1992) (seeking "to analyze diverse aspects of international commercial arbitration so as to determine to what extent arbitral tribunals are willing to perform the
independent role assigned to them by lex mercatoria theoreticians, namely, the creation of an
autonomous, anational and all-prevailing international commercial law"); Otto Sandrock, How
Much Freedom Should an International Arbitrator Enjoy?- The Desire for Freedom from Law v.
The Promotion ofInternational Arbitration, 3 AM. REV. INTL. ARB. 30, 32 (1992) (discussing the
danger that international commercial arbitration will become "delegalized," thereby hampering
rather than promoting its own development).
4. See, e.g.• MARTIN HUNTER ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATlON AND
ADR: CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL CoNTRACTS (1993); Markham Ball, Just Do It -Drafting
the Arbitration Clause in an International Agreement, 10 J. INTL. ARB. 29 (1993).
5. See ISAAK DORE, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MULTIPARTY COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1990).
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Chamber of Commerce (ICC)6 and the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA). 7 Dore states his purpose for Chapter One modestly at the beginning: "to present an introductory explanation of the
UNCITRAL arbitral process and to make simultaneous comparisons
with the salient features of the two other arbitral regimes that are the
most prominent alternatives to the UNCITRAL regime" (p. 3). At
the end of the chapter, however, he suddenly shifts his purpose, gearing his argument to a definite audience: "The chief purpose of this
chapter was to enable both arbitrators and lawyers to understand how
arbitral practice is conducted by being able to compare how the various frameworks for arbitration would react in the same situation" (p.
46). Dore's static purpose becomes a dynamic one. Initially settling
for mere "explanation," he eventually demands complete "understand[ing]." The fundamental tension between the desire to describe
and the desire to transform is apparent throughout the book. Dore
sets modest goals and achieves them, but he sometimes aspires even
higher.
Dare's three-way comparison is quite informative, and his crossreference table (pp. 47-51) provides a quick way to compare the various rule systems' treatment of a single issue, such as a party's right to
challenge an arbitrator. This fine table partly makes up for the multitiered index (pp. 215-22), which is insufficiently cross-referenced and
rather difficult to use.
The most serious problem with Chapter One is again one of approach. Dore chooses two rule systems - albeit important ones that are older than the UNCITRAL rules in order to make his project
easier. Without a doubt, the ICC and LCIA rules are "prominent alternatives" (p. 3); nevertheless, Dore neglects to mention other sets of
rules, such as the International Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), which are modeled after, but arguably improve upon, the UNCITRAL system. 8
Chapter Two concerns the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal's
adoption and adaptation of the UNCITRAL rules. Once again Dore
6. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARB!·
TRATION (as amended and effective on Jan. 1, 1988) (copy on file with author).
7. LoNDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, LCIA RULES (effective Jan. 1,
1985) (copy on file with author).
8. The AAA rules arguably improve upon the UNCITRAL rules by, for example, imposing
an explicit confidentiality obligation, excluding arbitrators from liability, and authorizing the
arbitrators to interpret the arbitration rules. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssN., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES arts. 35-37 (as amended and effective on Nov. 1, 1993) (copy on
file with author). Also, the AAA offers institutional arbitration, rather than ad hoc arbitration as
under UNCITRAL. Commentators tend to find institutional arbitration preferable under most
circumstances. See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 2-4; see also WILLIAM F. Fox, JR.,
INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS: A FUNCTIONAL PRIMER ON DRAFTING,
NEGOTIATING, AND RESOLVING DISPUTES§ 8.4, at 209 (1988) ("To avoid ••• problems, many
contracting parties provide for, or ultimately agree to, institutional arbitration ••••").
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defines his purpose narrowly, analyzing only the text of the rules as
the tribunal adopted them and stressing that he does not intend to
examine tribunal caselaw or the tribunal's contribution to international arbitration law. He concedes that J.J. van Hof achieved these
two goals in another work that he urges the reader to consult. 9 Unfortunately, Dore continues to rely heavily on van Hof and one other
source throughout the chapter. 10 Were it not for the insights, sprinkled throughout, of Judge Richard M. Mosk of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 11 the reader might better consult another book to
understand the tribunal's work.12
Dore next examines the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, 13 which UNCITRAL adopted in 1985 as part of its effort
to promote the worldwide harmonization of international arbitration
law. In Chapter Three, he proceeds to explain the Model Law article
by article, using the same headings as the Model Law itself for easy
cross-reference (pp. 101-27). This chapter commences with a shift in
tone. Although Dore still professes to focus on text rather than
travaux (p. 101 n.l), his textual analysis is more concise than in previous chapters and enlivened by explanations of how certain provisions
promote the goals of arbitration. Perhaps this shift results from having written extensively on the subject before. 14 Whatever the cause,
this chapter - and to an even greater extent the one that follows bridges the gap between the practical and. the theoretical much more
successfully than the first half of the book does. Dore discusses at
once the ultimate ends of arbitration and how to achieve them. Here,
for example, in the context of a discussion of an arbitrator's duty to
disclose, Dore speaks of the "search for certainty," the need for
9. Pp. 52-53 & n.1 (citing JACOMUN J. VAN HOF, CoMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES - THE APPLICATION BY THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991)).
10. Pp. 52-98 (citing VAN HOF, supra note 9, 19 times, and Stewart A. Baker & Mark D.
Davis, Establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal Under the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience of
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 23 INTL. LAW. 81 (1989), 15 times).
11. Judge Mask's influence is apparent throughout chapter 2. Not only does Dore explicitly
thank him for his help in the acknowledgments (p. vii), but he makes ample use of Mask's
separate opinions, even calling one "excellent." P. 67 n.47.
12. The reader curious about the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal should consult
STEWART A. BAKER & MARK D. DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES IN PRACTICE: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1992);
RAHMATULLAH KHAN, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1990); WAYNE MAPP,
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST TEN YEARS, 1981-1991 (1993);
VAN HOF, supra note 9; and JOHN A. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND
CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991).
13. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), Annex I at 81, U.N. Doc. A/40/17
(1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law], reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985).
14. Dore admits that he adapted much of this chapter from chapter 6 of ISAAK I. DORE,
ARBITRATION AND CoNCILIATION UNDER THE UNCITRAL RULES: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
(1986). P. 101 n.1.

1992

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1989

"flexib[ility], " and the close connection between the Model Law and
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (pp. 108-09). In a typically short,
two-page discussion, Dore manages to brief the reader on the requirements of article 12's "standard of impartiality" and to tie it in to the
purposes of both the Model Law and arbitration generally. 15
Admittedly, Dore employs words like certainty and .flexibility far
more often than he explains how or why the drafters created provisions to achieve those ends. 16 We learn that the three goals of the
Model Law are party autonomy, flexibility, and "equality and fairness."17 Dore, however, generally focuses on flexibility, with only an
occasional reference to party autonomy or equality. This focus leaves
the reader with the impression that the Model Law is - well - flexible. But flexibility is not always desirable. Most commentators acknowledge that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are the most
flexible of their kind, 18 and yet potential parties continue to rely heavily on other rule systems. 19
Flexible rules, at least, may encourage the delay tactics of recalcitrant parties.20 Dore himself acknowledges that they may "encourag[e] forum shopping and conflict between tribunal- and courtordered measures" (p. 28). Furthermore, while appropriate for parties
that deal with one another on a routine basis, flexible rules may not
work well for those who know that they will never deal with one another again. Can similar criticisms be made of a flexible law? Perhaps. Some of the variations on the Model Law Dore discusses in his
15. Pp. 108-09 (discussing UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 13, art. 12).
16. See, e.g., p. 114 ("The general formula of 'appropriate security' was deliberately chosen
by UNCITRAL to give flexibility to the tribunal."). Dore merely asserts that the formula promotes flexibility, rather than explaining how it does so.
17. P. 114. Later, Dore also mentions "privacy" as a hallmark of arbitral, rather than judi·
cial, dispute resolution. See pp. 144, 166.
18. See, e.g., HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 2-4 (noting that ad hoc arbitration, such as
arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules, "may be shaped to meet the wishes of the parties" to a
greater extent than institutional arbitration, such as arbitration under the ICC, the LCIA, or
other sets of rules).
19. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, § 8.5, at 210 ("The ICC was then - and remains - the
preeminent international arbitral body."); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 10 (noting the ICC's
"institutional cachet" and the "special credibility [given] to the awards rendered under its
Rules").
20. Martin Hunter and his coauthors note that:
The principal disadvantage of an ad hoc arbitration [such as one under the UNCITRAL
Rules] is that its effectiveness depends on the voluntary co-operation of the parties and their
lawyers in formulating and complying with procedural rules - often at a time when they
are already in dispute..••
Furthermore, it is not difficult to delay an ad hoc arbitration by raising questions of
jurisdiction or procedure. If one of the parties is recalcitrant from the outset of the proceedings, there will be no arbitral tribunal in existence available to deal with the situation.
Even when an arbitral tribunal is established and a set of rules has been adopted, ad hoc
arbitrations will not proceed as smoothly as institutional arbitrations if one of the parties
fails or refuses to play its part in the proceedings.
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 4, at 3. Dore notes the ad hoc versus institutional distinction but
fails to discuss its implications. See, e.g., pp. 5, 66-68.
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final chapter essentially attempt to make the Model Law more rigid
and more reliable. States and arbitral authorities want to ensure that a
system of arbitration is workable before they worry about uniformity.
Dore, however, never acknowledges that flexibility can be anything
but a panacea to the arbitration world's ills. His theoretical analysis is
incomplete without at least a cursory discussion of the pluses and minuses of a flexible system.
Chapter Four, entitled ulntemational Reaction to the Model
Law," is Dore's best. Unlike the two leading commentaries on the
Model Law, Dore's final chapter addresses the "growing number of
national enactments based in whole or in part on the Law."21 Dore
surveys the current state of international arbitration law in the countries in which the Model Law has had the greatest impact - the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada (pp.
128-84). It would have been interesting to learn about the Model
Law's impact in other countries as well. France, Switzerland, and
Belgium, for example, reportedly have "favourable legal environment[s]" for arbitration. 22 Although Dore need not have addressed
every country's reaction to the Model Law, a brief discussion of those
countries that have considered adopting the Model Law would have
helped the reader better gauge the extent to which the arbitral world
has accepted it.
That said, Dore's analysis of the countries he does discuss is insightful and well worth plodding through. For instance, he provides
an excellent analysis of federalism and its dangers for a workable system of international arbitration. Dore tackles the United States first,
discussing the conflict between the now out-of-date Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 23 and the often more modem laws of individual states,
some of which take after the Model Law, but all of which are to some
degree inconsistent with both the Model Law and federal law (pp. 12949). Dore convincingly argues for "concerted steps [to be] taken at the
federal level to harmonize and unify the law of international commercial arbitration" (p. 132). He also manages to blend practical advice
- such as when he warns of the potential for judicial interference with
arbitration in Texas (p. 141) - with quite sophisticated theoretical
analysis of which states' modifications of the Model Law are desirable
21. ARON BROCHES, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at vii (1990); see also HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN &
JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989).
22. BROCHES, supra note 21, at 20-21. For a fairly recent and truly comprehensive work on
French arbitration law, see MATTHIEU DE BmssEsON, LE DROIT FRAN~AIS DE L'ARBITRAGE
INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL (1990). See also ANDREAS BUCHER, LE NOUVEL ARBITRAGE
INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE (1988); MARCEL STORME & BERNADETTE DEMEULENAERE, INTERNATIONAL CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN BELGIUM: A HANDBOOK (1989).
23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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and why. 24 Dore's analysis of the "significant potential for non-uniform interpretation and application of community and international
law on commercial arbitration" in the European Community (p. 150),
as well as his revelation of the fundamental uncertainty as to whether
the federal government or the provinces are responsible for treaty
making in Canada (p. 171), further complicates his argument and supports his call for national and international lawmaking.
In his final chapter, Dore also illustrates the threat that historical
isolationism poses to a truly uniform system. Scotland adopted the
Model Law (pp. 150-51). England, however, has had a long history of
arbitration and possesses a fine-tuned system of its own that it sees
little reason to junk merely for the sake of world uniformity (pp. 15158). Dore even suggests that the "historic investment" of England and
other states may account for the lack of uniformity at the European
level (p. 150).
Dore also highlights how rules approximating the Model Law may
actually undermine its purposes. The section on the Netherlands
Arbitration Act25 provides - at last - an exceedingly good synthesis
of theory and practice. Dore compares the Dutch Act with the Model
Law, and in so doing notes the Dutch Act's areas of clarity and of
confusion. 26 This comparison is similar to the one he makes between
the different sets of arbitration rules in Chapter One. It goes much
further, however. Dore truly fuses the practical and the theoretical in
his discussion of the Dutch threat to party autonomy. He describes
exactly which provisions - such as the court's ability to consolidate
arbitrations over the opposition of the parties - threaten party autonomy, as well as why party autonomy is an important goal of arbitration: "[S]ince international arbitration is a preferred mechanism for
dispute resolution only when free from unwanted national laws, these
provisions may be a disincentive to non-Dutch nationals who might
otherwise be willing to subject their arbitration to Dutch law" (p.
164).
24. Dore informs us, for instance, that the Florida International Arbitration Act, despite not
being patterned after the Model Law, "incorporates many of the model law's basic policies, such
as enforcing arbitral agreements, minimizing judicial interference and promoting party auton·
omy.••• [I]n some respects •.. [it] goes even further than the model law. For example, it does
not attempt to confine the application of its provisions by defining 'international' or 'commer·
cial.'" P. 142 (discussing Florida International Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 684 (1993)
(footnote omitted)). See also p. 135 (noting a provision in Connecticut's arbitration law, CONN.
GEN. STAT.§ 50a-117 (1992), that increases party autonomy, thereby taking the Model Law one
step further).
25. WETBOEK VAN BURGERLUKE RECH1'SVORDERING bk. IV, arts. 1020-76, translated in
26 I.L.M. 923 (J.C. Schultsz trans., 1987).
26. For instance, Dore notes that an "arbitrator's appointment must be accepted by him in
writing, and that once appointed he cannot withdraw without the consent of the parties, a third
party appointed by them or the president of the district court," but he allows that "[i]t is unclear
what the effect would be under the new Dutch law in the unlikely event that an unwilling arbitra·
tor were not allowed to withdraw." P. 160.
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Chapter Four, then, succeeds in precisely the way that the others
fall short. Moreover, it is remarkably up-to-date and well informed.
Unlike Dore's discussion of the rules of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal, which drew heavily on other secondary sources, the material
in the final part of the book is new and interesting to read.
Dore concludes with a plea for uniformity after only a cursory examination of the benefits of a common law. 27 Never mind. Most of us
would probably agree that some uniformity - and certainty - is
good. After all, the New York Convention, the only significant multilateral convention in the international arbitration area, is thirty-five
years old. and concerns only the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 28 Even Dore seems to distrust :flexibility at the
national and supranational levels.29 The problem is that in his engaging final chapter Dore shows us that some jurisdictions have improved
on the Model Law in certain ways. If unification is pursued, what
version should we promote? Should we draft an UNCITRAL Model
Law II to take into account the improvements of the last few years?
Dore neither asks nor answers such questions.
This modest book achieves only modest results. It is neither the
one book you should resort to in an ongoing arbitration, nor the one
you should tum to in an intellectual debate. That said, its unique mix
of practical advice and theoretical conjecture recommends it to the
curious and to those who need not rely on a single book.
-

Alyssa A. Grikscheit

27. Gerold Herrmann makes a much more convincing argument for uniformity in Gerold
Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Introduction
and General Provisions, in EssAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3, 16-19
(Petar Sareevic ed., 1989).
28. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitra! Awards, opened for
signature June 10, 1958, entered into force June 7, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
29. Despite Dore's belief that "normative ambiguity is perhaps helpful, indeed necessary, for
the success of a flexible arbitral system" (p. 98), he apparently intends the ambiguity and flexibility to remain within a single system of arbitration law, rather than to permit the choice between
rival systems. See pp. 182-84.

